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Abstract 
Today, many countries around the world respond to the global warming and its consequences with 
various  policy  instruments  such  as  e.g.  taxes,  subsidies,  emission  permit  trading,  regulations  and 
information campaigns. In the economic literature, policy instruments have typically been analyzed 
with respect to efficiency, while little effort has been put on public preferences for these instruments. 
In this paper, an Internet-based choice experiment is conducted where respondents are asked to choose 
between two alternative policy instruments that both reduce the emissions of CO2 by the same amount. 
The policy instruments are characterized by a number of attributes; a technology-effect, an awareness-
effect,  cost  distribution,  geographic  distribution  and  private  cost  (presented  in  more  detail  in  the 
paper). By varying the levels of each of the attributes, respondents indirectly reveal their preferences 
for these attributes. Half of the respondents are faced with instruments labeled by „tax‟ and „other‟, 
whereas the other half are faced with unlabeled instruments. As for the label, the results show that 
people dislike the „tax‟. The results also show that people prefer instruments with a positive effect on 
environmentally-friendly technology and climate awareness. A progressive-like cost distribution is 
preferred to a regressive cost distribution, and the private cost is negatively related to the choice. 
Finally, the results indicate that Swedes want the reduction to take place in Europe but not necessarily 
in Sweden.  
Keywords: preferences; climate policy measures; choice experiment; web-survey 
JEL classification: H20; H31; Q48; Q50   
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1. Introduction 
The will to reduce greenhouse gases may take its expression in a variety of ways. As an 
economist,  you  would  perhaps  suggest  taxes,  subsidies  and  emissions  permit  trading  as 
appropriate tools for reducing greenhouse gases. However, lately we have seen other, perhaps 
more „non-standard‟, ideas on how to reduce greenhouse gases such as CO2. One example is 
the European law against light bulbs to make way for other less energy consuming lights. 
Another example is the Californian proposal of banning black cars because of their color. The 
California Air Resources Board argues that the climate control systems of dark colored cars 
need  to  work  harder,  and  thereby  consume  more  gasoline  than  their  lighter  siblings.  An 
economist  would  most  likely  object  to  the  suggestions  above  and  argue  that  it  is  more 
efficient to hit the source directly (e.g. with a CO2 tax), since it is not the light bulb or the 
color themselves that causes the problem. So, given the variety of climate policy instruments 
available, which one should be selected to reduce CO2?  Are there reasons for not using the, 
from an economic perspective, most efficient instruments available? What are the public‟s 
preferences for attributes characterizing climate policy instruments? 
Today, many countries have pledged to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases (primarily 
CO2)
1. Among these countries, Sweden started with corrective environmental taxes in 1991 
(carbon-, electricity- and sulfur taxes). In the Swedish case, the aim was not only to reduce 
greenhouse  gases,  but  also  to  reduce  the  levels  of  distortionary  income  taxes  already 
contained in the tax system
2. At the European level, emissions permit trading is at current use 
while a similar system, the cap and trade program is suggested in the US. Examples of other 
climate  policy  instruments  at  disposal  for  a  decision  maker  are  of  course  regulations, 
information  campaigns,  subsidies  etc.  However,  as  indicated  above,  the  perhaps  most 
straightforward approach from an economic perspective is to  look for the most cost efficient 
policy instrument available – meaning that a carbon tax or an emissions permit trading system 
will be some of the most preferred alternatives (market-based policies).
3 Why is it then the 
case that policy-makers often choose alternatives that   obviously are not the most  „cost 
efficient‟? Of course, one reason may be that the instrument does not reflect the political view 
                                                           
1 For example, according to the Kyoto protocol Annex I countries need to reduce their collective emissions of 
GHGs by 5.2% compared to the 1990 levels by the year 2012. 
2 See e.g. Brännlund and Kriström (1999), Brännlund and Nordström (2004). 
3 Traditionally, emission taxes and permit trading are both market-based approaches to reduce pollution; see e.g. 
Baumol et al (1988) and Dales (1968), Montgomery (1972), Thomas H. Tietenberg (1980), respectively. See 
also a paper by Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) for a discussion on efficient pollution regulation.  3 
 
of the incumbent government. Another reason may be that there is some more or less obvious 
disutility attached to the instrument itself. In the decision process, it is important to consider 
not only economic efficiency but also public preferences toward the suggested instruments. 
Specifically, policies that reflect public preferences are more likely to become efficient in 
practice. Although policies are cost efficient, it may lead to more tax avoidance and votes for 
sending  the  incumbent  government  out  of  office.  The  purpose  of  the  present  paper  is  to 
explore public preferences for attributes characterizing climate policy instruments, which then 
give  valuable  insights  for  future  policies  concerning  the  tradeoffs  between  pure  cost 
efficiency and public acceptance. 
There are previous studies trying to explore peoples‟ preferences for climate policy measures. 
Hammar and Jagers (2002) find that Swedish citizens prefer subsidies to encourage the use of 
environmentally friendly goods, instead of a tax on environmentally bad goods. An important 
drawback with their study is that they did not make clear that a subsidy imposes a cost to the 
government and, in the end, households. Bannon et al (2007) explores preferences for specific 
climate policies while also taking into account the cost imposed to the society. Specifically, 
they  studied  Americans‟  preferences  for  a  regulation,  an  emissions  tax  and  an  emissions 
permit  trading  system,  respectively.  Respondents  were  told  that  emissions  of  greenhouse 
gases should be reduced and their job was to choose the preferred alternative. In the survey, 
the reduction was held constant while the costs of the respective policy instrument varied. 
Their results indicate that Americans prefer rules and regulations before taxes and emissions 
permit systems.  
The purpose of this paper is to extend the literature in primarily two ways. First, we aim for a 
better understanding of public preferences toward different climate policy measures. This is 
pursued  through  a  choice  experiment  (CE)  where  the  respondents  are  asked  to  choose 
between climate policy measures characterized by a number of attributes (to be presented in 
the next section), while accounting for the respondents budget constraint. Each respondent is 
faced with repeated CE questions where the attribute levels are varied between each choice 
set. Hence, by varying the attribute levels we observe each attribute‟s influence on the choice 
of policy measure. A cost attribute is included as one of the attributes, meaning that we are 
able to attach a monetary value to the trade-off respondents make in their decision. Account is 
also taken to possible stigma effects from the labels attached to specific policy measures. 
Therefore, half of the sample faces a choice between generic policy instruments (labeled A 4 
 
and B), while the other half faces a choice between „tax‟ and „other‟. Note that we designed 
the experiment so that the attributes characterizing the policy instruments (besides the label) 
varies in the same way for both groups. The second contribution to the existing literature 
relates to the survey itself. The survey is internet-based and collects information from 2,400 
Swedish  citizens  (see  below  for  a  more  detailed  description  of  the  survey).  Web-based 
surveys are still quite rare and our study therefore gives valuable experience and guidance for 
future surveys to be conducted on the internet.  
The choice experiment approach for investigating people‟s preferences is becoming more and 
more common in the economics literature
4. The main advantage with a CE is that it, at least to 
some extent, replicates a realistic scenario. Respondents implicitly make trade-offs between 
the different characteristics while still considering the cost. These trade-offs are typically not 
captured in the related contingent valuation methods and, therefore, justifies a CE in a setup 
as ours. The CE approach of course relies on the assumption that respondents are inherently 
trained for making trade-offs. For scenarios with  well-known consumer products,  CEs are 
rather  standard  and  used  extensively in the marketing  and transportation  literature
5.  For 
example, how important are packaging, brand  name and price in the decision process for 
buying cereals or toothpaste? Unfortunately, the choice between climate policy instruments is 
much more unfamiliar for the public. But in comparison with other methods, CEs are still the 
most promising. It should however be mentioned that we do not intend to reflect all possible 
characteristics of each policy instrument. The important feature is that the cho sen attributes 
(characteristics) are relevant and affect people‟s decisions. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the survey development with its 
advantages and shortcomings, while also presenting descriptive statics for the sample. The 
paper then continues with the economic and econometric specification in section 3, while 
section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
                                                           
4The choice experiment approach has evolved from the Lancaster (1966) theory of value and the random utility 
theory; see e.g. Hanley et al. (1998). 
5 Designed choice experiments were introduced in the transportation and marketing research by Hensher and 
Louviere (1982) and Louviere and Woodworth (1983).  5 
 
2. The Survey 
2.1. The choice experiment 
The choice experiment concerns a choice between different policy measures characterized by 
a number of attributes. As indicated in the introduction, we are interested in preferences for 
each of these attributes. One of the attributes of particular interest is the „label‟ attached to 
policy instruments. Therefore, we have divided the sample so that half of the respondents face 
a choice between policy instruments A and B (the generic, unlabeled, case), while the other 
half choose between „tax‟ and „other‟ (the labeled case).
6 Besides the „label‟, the following 
attributes characterize our policy instruments.  
Table 1. Attributes in the survey. 
Attribute  Description  Levels 
Effect on the development of 
environmentally-friendly 
technology. 
Policies may affect the willingness 
to investment in new technologies, 
which may simplify the reduction 
of emissions. 
  Positive effect 
  Negative effect 
  No effect 
Increased climate „awareness‟ 
among Swedes. 
Policies may affect peoples‟ 
awareness of how their behavior 
influences the climate, which may 
lead to people acting more climate-
friendly. 
  Yes 
  No 
Social distribution of costs. 
Reduced emissions of CO2 impose 
a cost on society. The cost can be 
distributed across society in 
different ways. 
  All citizens pay the same 
amount (regressive). 
  All citizens pay the same share 
(percentage) of income 
(neutral). 
  Higher income citizens pay a 
larger share (higher 
percentage) of income 
(progressive). 
Geographic distribution of the 
reduction in emissions. 
Depending on the choice of policy 
instrument, the given reduction of 
CO2 may take place in different 
regions.  
  Sweden 
  Europe (but not Sweden) 
  Outside Europe 
 
Monthly cost (private) until 2012. 
The reduction of CO2 imposes a 
cost on society. Since you represent 
the society, you will face a cost. In 
some way the cost will occur, 
although the size depends on the 
chosen policy. 
  100 SEK 
  300 SEK 
  600 SEK 
  1000 SEK 
 
The selection of relevant attributes, and their respective levels, is of course of paramount 
importance. The way we have selected the attributes is through a process which starts from 
                                                           
6 See e.g. Blamey et al (2000) for specific issues regarding labeled and unlabeled experiments. 6 
 
basic ideas about climate policies and their inherent properties.
7 Focus groups were involved 
both to get an idea of how different selected attributes was perceived, but also to identify 
attributes that seems important, but for some reason was missed in the first stage.  After 
several focus groups, a pilot study was undertaken
8. Concerning the design and selection of 
attributes, the major difference between this study and the pilot study is that the present study 
has one additional attribute  – the geographic distribution of the emissions reduction. This 
particular  attribute  was  tested  in  extra  focus  groups  where,  as  in  the  initial  ones, 
questionnaires were filled out, discussed in open group discussions, revised and thereafter 
tested  in  new  focus  groups.  This  type  of  preparation  also  serves  to  find  an  „easy  to 
understand‟ format of the questions and the survey as a whole. The final attributes and their 
levels are those presented in Table 1.  
A fundamental starting point for the survey is that the Swedish parliament has decided to 
reduce Sweden‟s emission of greenhouse gases by 4 percent compared to the 1990 level. 
Specifically, the average emissions of greenhouse gases between 2008 and 2012 must, at 
least, be 4 percent lower than the 1990 level. Therefore, throughout the questionnaire it is 
emphasized that each alternative policy measure reduces the emission of CO2 by exactly 4 
percent – independent of the attributes attached to the respective instrument. Note that this 
assumption also applies to policies where the reduction takes place in several countries – the 
total reduction is still 4 percent in Swedish numbers. An example of a choice situation is 
presented in the Appendix. 
When respondents make their choices, they implicitly make trade-offs between the attributes 
attached to each alternative. To estimate each attribute‟s impact on the choice of instrument, 
their respective levels need to be varied. In our survey, each respondent faces a number of 
choice situations (12) where the levels of each attribute varies. The manageable number of 
choice  sets  to  each  individual  has  been  discussed  in  the  literature.
9  Too many sets are 
problematic since the respondent get tired and may create a habit/routine.  In addition, too 
many choice sets may also imply more non-responders; see Carlsson and Martinsson (2008). 
On the other hand,  too few sets may be problematic since the questions are rather complex  
                                                           
7 The International Panel on Climate Change identifies the following climate policy measures: Regulations and 
standards, Price mechanisms (taxes, charges), Price mechanisms (tradable permits), Financial incentives 
(subsidies), Voluntary agreements, Information instruments, Public R&D. 
8 See Cole and Brännlund (2009) for a more detailed description of the pilot study 
9 See e.g. Hensher et al (2001) and Carlsson and Martinsson (2008) for a discussion on the number of choice 
sets. 7 
 
and takes time to understand, meaning that respondents may not answer at all. As for the 
present survey, each respondent is supposed to manage 12 choice sets, of which the order is 
randomly drawn.  
To make any inference from the study, the number of choice sets and the variation of attribute 
levels facing each respondent are very important. The design of choice sets follows a process 
originating from a L
AC factorial (a full factorial), where C is the number of alternatives and A 
the  attributes  with  L  levels
10.  The full factorial represents all possible combinations of 
attributes and attribute-levels, which typically result in an unmanageable amount of choice 
sets for each respondent to consider. Based on pilot study information about the attributes, we 
eliminated too dominating alternatives from the full factorial and  thereby considered utility 
balance between alternatives
11. Having done that, we used a D-optimal procedure (OPTEX) in 
SAS to create the  choice sets; see Kuhfeld (2005). The procedure considers orthogonality, 
meaning that the variation of the attributes should be uncorrelated within and across each 
alternative. The assumption of no correlation across alternatives is only necessary for labeled 
experiments since the label itself may affect the choice. However, to have both split samples 
facing an identical questionnaire, we decided to use the same experimental design for both 
groups of respondents. Although our procedure generated a workable design with 21 choice 
sets, we decided to adjust the design for  efficiency  reasons  and increased the number of 
choice sets to 24.
12 Moreover, the 24 choice sets were divided into two blocks with 12 choice 
sets each  -  each respondent facing  one of the blocks .  Finally, in addition to the choice 
experiment  part, the questionnaire contained   questions  regarding  the  respondents‟  socio-
economic status and other climate-policy related issues.  
                                                           




2 = 46656 combinations. Note that, with generic 
alternatives the full factorial only consists of (3
3)(2
1)(4
1) = 216 combinations. The reason for having a full 
factorial of 46656 in the design process is that we, simultaneously, conducted a labeled experiment.  
11 We used a code-sum technique to eliminate choice sets where one alternative was too dominant. Considering 
the first, second and last attribute in Table1, choice sets with a maximum difference in code-sums between the 
respective alternative were eliminated. The reason for only considering three attributes was the information 
obtained in the pilot study about their respective distribution. 
12 The number of choice sets (24) was determined according to a macro (MktRuns) in SAS suggested by Kuhfeld 
(2005). The software ranks different designs according to efficiency measures.  We decided to choose the first 
design in this ranking with a reasonable number of choice sets. By comparison with the design suggested from 
degrees of freedom considerations only, the D-efficiency measure increased from 92,9 to 95,5. See e.g. Street 
et al (2005) for a discussion regarding efficiency measures and their importance. 8 
 
2.2. Survey method and sampling 
An important feature of our survey is that it is carried out on the internet, i.e. it is a web-based 
survey.  A  web-based  survey  has  many  advantages  by  comparison  with  a  standard  „mail‟ 
survey. Web-surveys are often less costly, more flexible and imply faster data collection. The 
flexibility  regards  how  you  can  easily  make  changes  in  an  already  existing  survey.  For 
example, if you suddenly realize that something is misunderstood you can correct it and re-
start the survey – imagine a mail survey where you need to redo the whole sample selection 
etc.  Regarding  flexibility,  it  is  also  more  convenient  to  randomize  questions,  do  more 
complex follow-ups etc. Data collection becomes very easy for a web survey since the data is 
coded correctly when you receive it. Moreover, there are no drop-outs or „blanks‟ since it is 
made technically impossible to skip a question. There are also some potential drawbacks with 
a web-based survey. The main reason as to why web-based surveys are questioned is that 
there may be a selection problem – only individuals with access to a computer and internet 
can be part of the study. However, it is not obvious that such a selection bias will be great in 
magnitude  in  all  circumstances.  The  point  is  that  this  issue  of  selection  bias  must  be 
considered and analyzed in each individual case, since access to computers and internet varies 
over countries and population groups within countries. Thus, one would expect that the bias 
of using the internet would be smaller in say Sweden than in a less developed country. In a 
less developed country a substantial part of the population may not have access to internet 
continuously, and more importantly, those who have access may not be representative for the 
population.  In  Sweden,  on  the  other  hand  an  overwhelming  part  of  the  population  has 
continuous access to a computer and internet, and the only significant difference in access and 
use of internet is between the most elderly people (more than 64 years) and the rest of the 
population.
13  Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  search  the  sample  carefully  for  possible 
weaknesses. 
2.3. Descriptive statics 
For data collection, we employed a company (Norstat) which controls an Internet panel with 
more than 90,000 pre-recruited respondents in Sweden (fall 2008). The panel differs from 
many similar panels in the sense that members are recruited randomly by telephone and self-
                                                           
13In 2008 88% of the population, between 16 and 74 years of age, had access to Internet in their home (Statistics 
Sweden, 2008). Furthermore, 84% of the population (16-74) states that they use Internet at least one time per 
day (Statistics Sweden, 2008). If we break down these numbers for different groups, concerning age, income, 
employment, unemployment, etc., the conclusion is that differences are small, except for the most elderly. 
http://www.scb.se/statistik/_publikationer/IT0102_2008A01_BR_IT01BR0801.pdf.   9 
 
recruitment is prohibited. Given the panel of 90,000 citizens, Norstat selected a representative 
sample according to age (18 and older), gender and geographic location. The survey was sent 
out in February 2009 to a sample of 2,400 Swedish citizens registered in the „Norstat panel‟.
14 
Half of the respondents were faced with the labeled choice sets, while the other  half were 
faced with the generic choice sets. In addition to the choice sets, the questionnaire contained 
one section with basic socio-economic questions while another section contained questions 
related to climate awareness and individual behavior in general. Table 2 summarizes some of 
the more interesting descriptive statistics among the 2,400 respondents (both split-samples). 
Table 2. Descriptive statics. 
  Description  Mean (st. 
dev) 
Percent  Swedish 
population 
Gender  Male    47.5  49.7 (2008)* 
Age  Years , 18-  50.47 
(15.2) 
  48.9 (2008)* 
Household income (SEK per month)  0-29,999 
30,000-79,999 
80,000 - 





Households with 2 or more children at home   -18 years old    24.2  16% (2006)* 
Households with 2 or more incomes      74.9   
University education      46.5  33% 


















If CO2 from motor vehicles must be reduced – what 
would you prefer?  
Tax on fossil fuels 
Information campaign 
Regulations 
Increased income tax 





Do you believe that the current governmental 
expenditure on env. protection is too low. 
Yes    59.2   
How should the cost be distributed?  „Polluter pays‟ 
„Those who afford pay‟ 
„Those  who  think  it‟s 
important pay‟ 
„Everyone  share  the  cost 
equally‟ 






* Statistics Sweden, www.scb.se         
 
                                                           
14 Specifically, the first sample (2,000 surveys) had an overweight for elderly people, implying an additional 
sample of 400 „younger‟ people. 10 
 
By comparison with the Swedish population, the sample looks quite representative although 
we have not formally tested for the differences. One obvious difference is however that our 
sample  is  more  educated  (the  reason  is  unknown,  although  it  may  be  by  pure  chance). 
Moreover, answers from some of our climate-policy related questions are potentially very 
interesting. For example, 59.2 percent believes that current expenditures on environmental 
protection  are  too  low  and  an  absolute  majority  thinks  that  the  polluter  should  pay  the 
reduction of CO2. It is also worth noting that the direct question regarding which instrument 
to be used for a reduction of CO2 corresponds to Hammar and Jagers (2002). That is, without 
the  „cost-attribute‟  most  respondents  prefer  information  campaigns,  followed  by  the 
regulations  alternative  –  taxes  are  not  very  popular.  In  our  view,  the  findings  above  are 
interesting but to simplistic since they do not reflect real world scenarios. The results from the 
choice experiment questions work to fill this gap. 
3. Econometric specification 
The choice-question responses obtained from the questionnaires are primarily analyzed in the 
random parameter logit (RPL) framework – although results from a standard logit are also 
presented.
15 One important characteristic of t he RPL-model is that it does not exhibit the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property  (well known from the traditional logit 
model) and that it allows for unobserved heterogeneity; see e.g. Train (2003). We do not here 
intend to formally derive the RPL model since this  has been done in many other studies and, 
in addition, we follow the standard procedures.
16 However, some basics should be mentioned 
before we proceed.  Let us define the utility experienced by individual  q  from  choosing 
alternative j in choice situation t as 
jtq jtq q jq jtq X U         (1) 
where X is the vector of explanatory variables including attributes attached to each of the 
alternatives.  jq  is the alternative specific intercept which allows for an intrinsic preference 
for  the  alternative  itself  (not  necessarily  applicable  for  the  unlabeled  experiment).  The 
unobserved parts of the equation is hence  jq  ,  q   and  jtq  , which are treated as stochastic. 
                                                           
15 The RPL-model is also known as the mixed logit, mixed multinomial logit and hybrid logit.  
16 For a more detailed description of the RPL-model, see e.g. Train (2003), Hensher and Green (2001) and 
Hensher et al. (2005). 11 
 
Of course, the respondent knows the value of his own  jq  ,  q   and  jtq  for all j and chooses 
the alternative with the highest utility. In the standard logit context it is assumed that the error 
term,  jtq  ,  is  independent  and  identically  distributed  (IID)  extreme  value  type  1  across 
individuals  as  well  as  across  alternatives  and  choice  situations.  One  way  to  relax  this 
assumption  is  to  divide  the  stochastic  part  into  two;  one  correlated  over  alternatives  and 
heteroskedastic,  the  other  IID  over  alternatives  and  individuals.  That  is  (ignoring  the  t 
subscript),  
jq jq jq jq jq x U        
' ,  (2) 
where  jq   is a random term whose distribution over individuals and alternatives depends on 
underlying  parameters  and  observed  data  related  to  each  alternative  and  individual.  In 
principle,  can take on any distributional form such as normal, lognormal, triangular etc. As 
long  as  jq    is  IID  type  1  extreme  value,  we  have  a  random  parameter  logit  model.  By 
denoting  the  density  of   by     |  f ,  where    are  the  fixed  parameters  of  the  true 
parameters of the distribution, the conditional choice probability becomes 
     
'' exp / exp jq q jq jq jq kq kq kq
k
S x x              ,  (3) 
for a given value of  q  . However since  q  is unknown, it is not possible to condition on q  . 
Therefore, we use the unconditional choice probability which is the logit formula integrated 
over all values of  q  weighted by the density, 
    q q q jq j d f S P      .  (4) 
This  integral  is  evaluated  with  a  simulated  maximum  likelihood  estimato r  using  Halton 
draws
17. In our case, it is not obvious which distribution to assume for each parameter since 
there is no clear-cut prior information. Therefore, we assume a normal distribution for all the 
attributes (except the cost) in our experiment. It is also worth noting that our data consists of 
several  observations  from  the same individual.  This  potentially  gives  rise  to  correlated 
                                                           
17 Halton draws are more efficient than standard random draws. The number of draws has been discussed in the 
literature; see e.g. Bhat (2001) and Train (2000). With the Halton procedure, it has been found that 25 draws 
may produce stability, but larger numbers are preferred (typically a minimum of 100 draws).  12 
 
responses across observations via the sequencing of choice sets and possible learning and 
inertia effects. This potential problem is, to some extent, dealt with since our choice sets are 
randomly ordered for each respondent. 
In the final specification the vector X of explanatory variables contains the attribute levels 
defined by table 1. The first four attributes in table 1 have been „dummy-coded‟ so that the 
base  level  of  each  attribute  is  „no-effect‟,  „no‟,  „same  amount‟  and  „outside  Europe‟, 
respectively.  The  cost  attribute  has  been  divided  by  1000  but  not  dummy-coded.  The 
advantage of dummy coding is that it allows for non-linearity in the attribute levels. With 
standard dummy coding however, the base level of an attribute will be perfectly confounded 
with the overall mean (constant) – the base-level utility cannot be separated from the overall 
mean.  Therefore,  we  used  the  alternative  approach  of  effects-coded  attributes.  The  basic 
intuition follows standard dummy codes although the base-level is now set to -1 instead of 0. 
Given our specification, nine parameters need to be estimated – the total number of attribute 
levels,  minus  one  for  each  attribute,  plus  the  parameter  corresponding  to  the  cost  and  a 
constant. The parameter estimates measure the effect that a particular attribute level has on the 
choice (dependent variable) which, therefore, also reflects the marginal utility of the particular 
attribute level. Finally, by defining the marginal rate of substitution for each attribute level in 
terms of the cost parameter, a monetary value can be attached to the utility change from each 
attribute level. 
4. Estimation results 
The random parameter logit, and the standard logit, have been estimated in NLOGIT 4. For 
the  labeled  experiment,  it  is  straightforward  to  include  an  alternative  specific  intercept 
(constant) to explicitly capture the label-effect. For the unlabeled experiment is not obvious 
why to include an alternative specific intercept – there is no obvious rationale for choosing 
one alternative before the other. Still, it is possible that respondents derive some intrinsic 
utility from always choosing one, or the other, alternative. Therefore, we decided to include 
an alternative specific constant for the unlabeled experiment as well. This has become more or 
less common practice in the literature and produces a better model-fit in our case. In our 
model specification, all parameter estimates, except for the cost attribute, are assumed to be 
randomly distributed with a normal distribution. To us, there is no obvious reason to assume 
any other distribution since it would impose a substantial restriction on the estimates. For 13 
 
example, a log-normal distribution would have restricted the parameter estimate to be strictly 
positive. As for the fixed parameter of the cost attribute, it is convenient to assume non-
randomness when calculating the marginal willingness to pay for an attribute. Moreover, the 
non-randomness assumption also restricts the cost variable to be negative for all individuals. 
This, to some extent, follows the existing literature and implies that the „willingness to pay‟ 
(WTP) has the same distribution as the parameter estimate; see e.g. Carlsson et al. (2003).
18 
For both the unlabeled and labeled experiment, the estimated standard deviations in the RPL 
model are significant which indicates heterogeneity in preferences among the respondents. 
The likelihood ratio for both split-samples tells us that the RPL model improves the model-fit 
by comparison to the standard logit mo del. As can be seen in tables 3 and 4, all parameter 
estimates  are  significa nt  at  the  5 %  level.  The  respective  sign  of  each  coefficient  are 
potentially very interesting.  To begin with, a change in the technology effect from „no‟ to 
„positive‟ increases the probability of choosing that alternative, while a change from „no‟ to 
„negative‟  tends  to  decrease  the  probability.  Moreover,  policies  that  increase  the  climate 
awareness  tends  to  increase  the  probability  of  choosing  that  alternative.  Continuing  with 
distribution  of  cost,  the  base  level  is  „same  amount‟  which  should  be  interpreted  as  a 
regressive  tax  system.  Accordingly,  a  change  from  a  regressive  tax  system  to  a  more 
progressive system  (the „same share‟ level  included) works  to  increase the probability of 
choosing the policy. As for the geographic burden of the emissions reduction, we find that it 
is positive if the reduction takes place in the European region but not in Sweden (outside 
Europe is the base level). Finally, the cost for the reduction in CO2 has a negative impact on 
the probability of choosing a policy.  
A potentially very interesting result arises from the alternative specific constant (ASC). For 
the unlabeled experiment, it is obvious that there is a tendency for picking the first alternative 
(the coefficient is positive). We do not have any good explanations for this result but recalls 
that there should be no difference between alternative A and B since they are generic by 
construction. In light of the labeled experiment this finding becomes even more interesting 
since  the  alternative  specific  constant,  reflecting  the  label-effect,  becomes  significantly 
negative.  Accordingly,  although  the  tax  alternative  is  the  first  alternative,  the  alternative 
                                                           
18 Denote the fixed cost parameter as β1 and an attribute with a normally distributed parameter with mean β2 and 
standard deviation β3. The willingness to pay for the attribute then becomes normally distributed with mean β2/ 
β1 and standard deviation β3 /β1. In our marginal WTP measures, we have taken the point estimates as given 
and ignore the sampling variance in these estimates. 14 
 
specific  constant  turns  negative,  which  makes  the  negative  label-effect  from  „tax‟  even 
stronger. 
Generally,  the  interpretation  of  the  coefficient  values  is  not  straightforward  in  terms  of 
absolute numbers. The calculated WTP for a change in each of the attribute levels therefore 
work to increase the understanding. As can be seen from the tables, the WTP measures are 
significantly different from zero. Moreover, since the absolute WTP-values are non-trivial, 
this  illustrates  the  importance  of  each  attribute  in  a  real-world  choice  situation.  The 
interpretation of the differences in WTP between the two split-samples is not obvious. The 
results show that „income distribution‟ is valued more in the unlabeled experiment than in the 
labeled. To speculate, one interpretation could be that the tax label is perceived to reflect 
some implicit income distribution. Does the tax label signals a progressive distribution since 
this is typical for the income tax-system in Sweden? 
Table 3. The unlabeled experiment, standard error within parenthesis. 
  Logit  Random parameter 
logit 
Random parameter 
logit  Willingness To Pay 
  Coefficient  Coefficient  Standard error  Coefficient (SEK) 
ASC  0.213*** 
(0.020) 
0.292*** 







































































Cost  -2.007*** 
(0.042) 
-3.068*** 
(0.190)  Fixed   
Log-likelihood  -7,879  -7,847     
McFadden Pseudo R-
squared    0.214     
No. of respondents  1,200  1,200      
No. of observations  14,400  14,400     




Table 4. The labeled experiment, standard error within parenthesis. 
  Logit  Random parameter 
logit 
Random parameter 
logit  Willingness To Pay 
  Coefficient  Coefficient  Standard error  Coefficient (SEK) 
ASC  - 0.063*** 
(0.018) 
-0.131*** 
(0.038)     


































































Cost  -1.261*** 
(0.036) 
-2.132*** 
(0.149)  Fixed   
Log-likelihood  -8,921  -8,890     
McFadden Pseudo R-
squared    0.105     
No. of respondents  1,194  1,194     
No. of observations  14,328  14,328     
No. of Halton draws    125     
 
4.1. Policy simulations 
The results from the choice experiment can now be used to „simulate‟, or illustrate, different 
policy packages characterized by different combinations of attribute levels. Such simulations 
may be of interest as illustrations of the utility change, and hence willingness to pay, for 
different policy packages.  
First, we define a reference policy package with attributes that approximately corresponds to 
the current Swedish climate-policy. The utility level attached to this reference package is 
denoted U0, whereas the utility attached a hypothetical alternative policy is denoted U1. The 
utility from changing policy can then be written as 
10
10 () U U U X X X               ,  (5) 
where  and  are the estimated parameters ( is a vector), and X is the vector of variables 
corresponding to the  vector. Then, by dividing with the marginal utility of money (the cost 16 
 







     ,  (6) 
where the vector β does now not include βcost.  
The current Swedish climate policy has two very central components – the CO2 tax and the 
European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). As for the CO2 tax, it is an explicit tax 
on the CO2 content of fossil fuel and differentiated in the sense that the industry sector faces a 
lower rate than the non-industry sector. On the other hand, a large portion of the industry is 
included in the EU-ETS.
19 Accordingly, it is fair to say that current Swedish policy measures 
can be characterized as „market based‟, aiming at reductions within Sweden and to some 
extent within other European countries. Given the attributes characterizing policy measures in 
our study, we have tried to construct a reference scenario with the objective to match Swedish 
policy (denoted SC-0 in what follows).  
The reference scenario (SC-0) will be compared with two other scenarios that are supposed to 
reflect somewhat different, but still relevant, policy packages. The first alternative scenario 
(SC-1) reflects a “global trading” (or global tax) scenario. That is, emission reductions are 
allowed to be outside Sweden and Europe, and the scenario is assumed to imply incentives for 
development of new technologies, but not to create any specific climate awareness among 
Swedes. Moreover, this scenario is supposed to be neutral in cost distribution. The second 
scenario (SC-2) is more of a “campaign” scenario. Reductions are taken place within Sweden, 
relatively low incentives for technology development, but a high degree of climate awareness 
among Swedes. The distribution of costs will be relatively progressive (potentially financed 
through an income tax).
20 
Given the scenarios above, we calculate the willingness to pay for a change from SC-0 to each 
of the  two  alternative scenarios, respectively. Table 5  summarizes the scenarios with the  
corresponding attribute levels and the WTP for a change from SC-0. 
                                                           
19 The lower rate for the industry is not applicable for vehicle fuels (diesel and gasoline). For a recent review of 
Swedish climate policy in general and the CO2 tax and energy taxes in particular, see Brännlund (2009). 
20 Of course, there are a number of other possible policy packages. Recall, however, that the effect from 
packages with a change in just one attribute is found from the corresponding estimate presented in the results 
section. 17 
 
Table 5. Scenarios and the attribute levels, standard error within parenthesis. 
Attribute  SC-0   SC-1  SC-2 
Effect on the development of 
environmentally-friendly technology.  Positive effect  Positive effect  Negative 
Increased climate „awareness‟ among 
Swedes.  Yes  No  Yes 
Social distribution of costs.  Regressive  Neutral  Progressive 
Geographic distribution of the reduction 
in emissions.  Sweden  Not Sweden  Sweden 
WTP










      
 
In general,  each parameter estimate has a variance and   it is difficult to find statistically 
significant estimates of the WTP for a change from one scenario to another.  Basically, the 
variance is increasing with the number of  needed parameter estimates in the utility-change. 
Nevertheless, given the results presented earlier in the paper, it  is perhaps expected that a 
change to “global trading” policies (SC-1) does not matter to Swedes (with estimates from the 
unlabeled experiment). By looking at the point estimates, people value the social distribution 
of cost and the geographic distribution approximately equal as the loss of climate awareness 
effects. People dislike regressive cost distributions and domestic reductions of CO2, but like 
increased climate awareness.  
As for the hypothetical change to a „CO2 campaign‟, it tends to have a positive WTP although 
not significant at any reasonable level (with estimates from the unlabeled experiment). In this 
case, the point estimates give us that people tend to value the positive effect on the social 
distribution  of  cost  (regressive  to  progressive)  more  than  the  negative  effect  on  climate 
friendly technology. Recall that, for a choice of policy without any „trade-offs‟ (see table 2), 
respondents preferred a campaign alternative. This is hence not supported (significant) when 
respondents  are  faced  with  the  „trade-offs‟  implicitly  captured  by  the  different  attributes 
including the „cost‟. 
                                                           
21 The WTP for a change is calculated from equation (6) and the standard errors are calculated with the Wald 
command in Limdep. It is important to recall that the variables (attributes) are dummy-coded with a „base 
level‟ of -1. 18 
 
To conclude, the policy „simulation‟ does not give decision makers any clear-cut guidance of 
how to change their policies – CO2 policies have many built-in characteristics and trade-offs. 
In addition, it turns out to be important that the WTP measures found in the simulation is 
calculated from the estimates in the unlabeled experiment. By using the estimates from the 
labeled experiment, a change from SC-0 to any of the other scenarios implies a negative WTP 
of approximately 100 SEK (significant at the 5%-level of significance). However, since we 
believe that estimates from the unlabeled experiment are the most relevant in the simulation 
setup, this  only  reflects how sensitive  the WTP  measure becomes for a simulated policy 
change.
22 
5. Summary and discussion 
The purpose of this study has been to provide better understanding of the public‟s attitudes 
toward  climate  policy  measures  and  their  inherent  characteristics.  The  reason  for  this 
particular  interest  is  the  obvious  deviation  between  the  climate  policy  recipe  found  in 
textbooks in environmental economics, and actual policy. The textbook recipe is crisp and 
clear, stating that a uniform tax, or a single market for emissions trading, will be sufficient as 
a  policy  measure.  Actual  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  is  far  from  clear  in  the  sense  that 
numerous different policy measures are implemented side by side, in which taxes and permit 
markets  in  some cases  are included. There are many potential  reasons  for this  deviation, 
although it is fair to say that the textbook recipe only consider efficiency, whereas in reality 
there  are  other  social  goals  that  have  to  be  considered.  Policy-makers  may  consider  e.g. 
equity, regional distribution and ideological preferences. This study then, where we present 
the results from an Internet-based choice experiment, shed some light over the question why 
people  tend  to  prefer  one  policy  measure  over  the  other.  However,  it  may  also  serve  as 
guidance to policy makers, taking not only efficiency arguments into account.  
The results show that all the attributes included in the experiment have a significant impact on 
individual‟s choice of preferred policy. Furthermore, the results clearly shows that a policy 
that has the label “tax” is disliked, relative to a policy which do not have the “tax” label. That 
is, given the same attribute levels, the probability for picking the one with the tax label is less 
than if it not labeled as a “tax”.  
                                                           
22 It is not relevant to use estimates from an experiment with the labels „tax‟ and „other‟ if we are to simulate 
respondents preferences for other types of policies. 19 
 
Concerning the attribute levels, it is shown that people prefer instruments with a positive 
effect on environmentally-friendly technology and climate awareness. A progressive-like cost 
distribution is preferred to a regressive cost distribution, and the private cost is negatively 
related to the choice. Finally, the results indicate that Swedes want the reduction to take place 
in Europe but not necessarily in Sweden.  
The purpose with the “policy simulations” is to illustrate how a change in policy may affect 
utility  in  terms  of  WTP.  Here,  we  consider  two  hypothetical  scenarios  relative  to  a 
(hypothetical) reference scenario. The results from the scenario analysis do not give policy 
makers any clear-cut guidance on what type of policy to pick if they were to consider peoples 
preferences  and  maximize  utility.  In  addition,  the  different  scenarios  are  constructed  for 
illustrative purposes and give, of course, a very simplistic picture of any real-world situation. 
There are of course weaknesses with a choice experiment study as ours. To begin with, a 
survey  is  always  faced  with  potential  cognitive  and  perception  problems/biases.  As  a 
researcher,  you can never guarantee that respondents  understand and interpret  your  given 
questions  and  information  as  expected.  Moreover,  the  survey  is  web-based  and  we  have 
relatively little experience whether such studies are biased in one way or another. In our case, 
we think that our sample is representative for the Swedish population, but we do not know 
anything about drop-out preferences etc.  
As for future research, it is of course important to further explore people‟s preferences for 
policy measures. In addition, an increase in the use of web-based surveys will hopefully give 
us valuable inputs on how to interpret and handle unobserved drop-outs etc. 




Below you find examples of the choice-questions in the unlabeled- and labeled experiment, 
respectively. 
 
Question… (an example from the unlabeled experiment) 
Consider the following policies, A and B. Which of these two, A or B, do you choose for a reduction in CO2 by 2,4 million 
tons (4 percent). Tick one of the alternatives. 
  POLICY A  POLICY B 
Effect on the development of 
environmentally-friendly technology. 
NEGATIVE  NO EFFECT 
Increased climate ‘awareness’ among 
Swedes. 
NO  YES 
Social distribution of costs.  Higher income citizens pay a larger 
share (higher percentage) of income 
All citizens pay the same amount 
Geographic distribution of the reduction 
in emissions. 
Sweden: 0 ton 
Europe (not Sweden): 2,4 million ton 
Outside europe: 0 ton 
Sweden: 2.4 million ton 
Europe (not Sweden): 0 ton 
Outside europe: 0 ton 
Monthly cost (private) until 2012.  1000 SEK  300 SEK 
 
My choice (tick your choice) 
 
[    ] 
 
[    ] 
 
Note! Both policies reduce the total emission of CO2 by 2,4 million ton each, no more no less.  
 
Question… (an example from the labeled experiment) 
Consider the following policies, A and B. Which of these two, A or B, do you choose for a reduction in CO2 by 2,4 million 
tons (4 percent). Tick one of the alternatives. 
  TAX  OTHER 
Effect on the development of 
environmentally-friendly technology. 
NEGATIVE  NO EFFECT 
Increased climate ‘awareness’ among 
Swedes. 
NO  YES 
Social distribution of costs.  Higher income citizens pay a larger 
share (higher percentage) of income 
All citizens pay the same amount 
Geographic distribution of the reduction 
in emissions. 
Sweden: 0 ton 
Europe (not Sweden): 2,4 million ton 
Outside europe: 0 ton 
Sweden: 2.4 million ton 
Europe (not Sweden): 0 ton 
Outside europe: 0 ton 
Monthly cost (private) until 2012.  1000 SEK  300 SEK 
 
My choice (tick your choice) 
 
[    ] 
 
[    ] 
 
Note! Both policies reduce the total emission of CO2 by 2,4 million ton each, no more no less.  
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